This paper models investment/entry decisions in a competitive industry that is subject to a quantity control, either on output or on a production input. The quantity control is implemented via the sale of licenses for the restricted output/input. We show that liberalizing the quantity control could reduce investment in the industry under certain circumstances. Furthermore, the level of investment in the industry is different depending on whether the licenses are tradable or not. Key factors to consider are the elasticity of demand for the final good and the degree of input substitutability. Two examples are presented to illustrate the results.
Introduction
Quantity controls on production inputs and outputs are commonly used throughout the world. In transition countries, input rationing is still prevalent in many industries. In some developing countries, import licensing and foreign exchange controls may restrict the quantity of inputs available to domestic firms. In industrial countries, quantity controls are often used to regulate natural resource industries such as timber and fishing; they have also been imposed in response to supply shocks such as those experienced with petroleum or electricity, and for environmental reasons such as pollution reduction.
For analytical purposes, there is a close similarity between input quotas and output quotas. Input rationing is usually implemented by issuing licenses or permits for the restricted input. Output rationing is usually implemented by issuing licenses or permits for the restricted output-since a license is required in order to produce a certain amount of output, the license can be thought of as a restricted input that is necessary for production. Hence, output quotas or production controls can be thought of as a special case of input rationing.
The initial allocation of licenses may be based upon certain criteria, such as firms' historical performance, or effected by auction. In some cases, these licenses are tradable; in other cases, they are not. This is a particularly important issue in agricultural and natural resource economics, where production controls are most likely to be implemented. For example, in fisheries management, some countries-notably Iceland and New Zealand-have introduced a system of individual transferable quotas whereby an annual quota for a particular species (the total allowable catch) is distributed among individual firms by means of licenses that are tradable; other countries are still weighing the merits of this system vis-à-vis alternative measures such as nontransferable individual fishing quotas. Similarly, in the dairy and poultry industry, there are ongoing discussions within the United States and the European Union on the advantages of a supply management system like Canada's, where farmers have to purchase a tradable permit to produce a specified amount of output. License tradability is also an important issue in environmental policy-one of the aims of the Kyoto Protocol is to design an international trading system for greenhouse gas emissions.
The impact of license tradability on investment in the affected industry is an important issue that has not received sufficient attention in the existing literature. This paper considers the investment decision in a competitive industry that is subject to input/output rationing, where the quantity control is implemented via the sale of licenses for the restricted input/output. Our objective is to compare the level of investment in the industry when the licenses are transferable and when they are not.
1 Our model differs from that of Melitz (2003) in that we do not focus on how the distribution of firms is affected by the licensing regime; the distribution is the same under license transferability and nontransferability. Rather, our focus is on how the allocation of capital across heterogeneous firms is affected by the licensing regime.
A similar problem is analyzed in Spencer (1997) , which considers the effects of a licensing requirement on imported capital equipment, comparing the outcome under an exogenous bureaucratic allocation (nontransferable quota licenses) with that under a market allocation (transferable licenses). Unlike Spencer (1997) , however, the analysis used in this paper draws on the model developed in Krishna and Tan (1999) , which compares the endogenous outcomes from transferable licenses and nontransferable licenses with a fixed number of firms.
2 To the extent that license possession enables a firm to produce the final product, the license market will be closely linked to the market for the final product. This paper thus extends the analysis in Krishna and Tan (1999) by explicitly modeling the product market as well as firm entry and exit.
The Model
We use a two-period, partial equilibrium setting which focuses on the market for licenses and the related market for the final good that is produced using the licenses. The demand for licenses is essentially a derived demand for an input, hence the license market is modeled as a secondary market that is linked to the product market where the primary activity of the firms takes place. We assume both markets are perfectly competitive.
Our model includes an element of uncertainty in the form of a firmspecific productivity shock that affects the efficiency of final good production. Weninger and Just (2002) study entry and exit behavior in a natural resource industry that is managed with tradable output permits, but do not compare it to the case with nontradable permits.
2 In many practical applications, the initial allocation of licenses is not endogenous. For example, the initial allocation of tradable fishing quotas in New Zealand and Iceland were not effected by auction but by free distribution to existing firms based primarily on historical catch (see OECD (1999) ). However, such schemes are generally considered inferior to market-based mechanisms such as allocation by auction, on efficiency and equity grounds (see Morgan (1997) , for example).
3 It is necessary to introduce uncertainty because, as explained in Krishna and Tan (1999) , if every economic agent knows with full certainty his or her valuation of a license at all times, and if the initial allocation of licenses is determined endogenously (reflecting the voluntary choice of each agent), then there will be no scope for resale, and transferability will confer no benefit (or equivalently, nontransferability will imply no cost). Moreover, the uncertainty has to be at the The timing of events is as follows. In Period 1, firms decide whether to enter the industry (invest a unit of capital, K ) at a cost of r per unit of capital. Upon entry, they buy licenses ( Z ), which are needed for production later. In Period 2, they realize their actual productivity and produce output. If the licenses are transferable, they may also buy and sell licenses at this point; if the licenses are nontransferable, they cannot use more than what they purchased in Period 1.
The final good is produced using a constant returns to scale production function ( , ) F K Z , which satisfies the usual Inada conditions (that is, the marginal product of an input is decreasing, tends to zero as the input tends to infinity, and tends to infinity as the input tends to zero). Firms differ according to productivity, indexed by β , where β is a random variable distributed as ( ) h β . One may consider, for example, a competitive agricultural industry that faces a quantity restriction on farm equipment or agrochemical inputs: all farms utilize the same technology but their output (harvest) may differ due to random effects such as weather and soil conditions. Since the production function is characterized by constant returns to scale, the size of firms is indeterminate as long as they behave competitively, and K can be interpreted as the total number of firms in the industry, with 1 K = for each firm. Hence, K denotes both the level of investment as well as the level of entry. In what follows, the terms "investment" and "entry" will be used interchangeably.
The output of any given firm is
, where z denotes the firm's license input, ( ) f z is the intensive form of (1, ) F z , ( ) 0 f z ′ > , and
This form is equivalent to random Hicks-neutral technical change.
Firms with high realizations of β have a higher total factor productivity than firms with low realizations of β . In the agricultural example given above, farms with low realizations of β will have poor harvests; those with high realizations of β will have good harvests.
The ex ante distribution of β is the same for all firms, although their ex post realizations will not be the same. Since there is a continuum of firms, and assuming that β is independently and identically distributed, the ex ante distribution of β for each firm can be interpreted as being the same as the ex post distribution of realizations of β across all firms in the industry. 4 individual rather than the aggregate level-if all agents faced a common shock, there will again be no scope for resale and no benefit from transferability.
Demand for the final product is denoted by ( ) D P , where ( ) 0 D P ′ < . The number of licenses available for sale (i.e., the quota level for the restricted input) is exogenously set by the government at Z . In the case of input quotas, possession of a license gives a firm the right to use a specified amount of the restricted input; in the case of output quotas, possession of a license gives a firm the right to produce a specified amount of the restricted output.
Transferable Licenses
First, consider the case of transferable licenses. This means that although the firms must purchase licenses from the government before knowing β , they may freely trade their licenses after β is realized, that is, they may re-optimize their license allocation ex post. Effectively, therefore, the license market and the product market clear in Period 2. The model is solved backwards, beginning with Period 2.
Period 2
In Period 2, each firm has already invested one unit of capital and knows what its realization of β is. Hence, it will demand licenses up to the point where the value of the marginal product of a license is equal to the price of a license, denoted by v :
( 1 ) Equation (1) implicitly defines the firm's demand for licenses:
.
As long as the Inada conditions are met, all firms will demand some licenses. Note that ( , / ) 0
Given the total number of licenses, Z , the license market clears when the industry's demand for licenses is equal to Z :
Equation (3) implicitly defines the license price, ( , / ) 
, and industry output as:
where ( / ) ( ( , / )) ( )
. Note that the industry production function,
T Q K Z , is homogeneous of degree one in K and Z . Furthermore,
T q Z K satisfies all the properties of the intensive production function.
The product market clears when aggregate supply of the final good equals aggregate demand: ( ) ( , ).
Equation (5) yields the equilibrium product price, ( , )
T P K Z , we can now write the equilibrium license price as a function of K and Z only: 5 Note that industry output does not depend on the product price, P . For any given β , a firm's input use depends on the ratio of the license price to the product price (from Equation (2)). Since an increase in P raises the license price by the same proportion, it will not change a firm's input use (for a given β ) and therefore, it will not change industry output.
The intuition for the second result is as follows. Note that an increase in K (at a given Z ) has two effects on ( , )
T v K Z . The first (scarcity) effect raises the industry demand for licenses-with Z fixed, licenses become relatively more scarce, and this tends to push the license price, T v , up. The second (output) effect increases supply of the final product, reducing the product price, and thereby reducing each firm's demand for licenses-this tends to push T v down. Since the two effects work in opposite directions,
T v K Z could be increasing or decreasing in K . It is decreasing in K when the output effect is strong, i.e., when demand for the final good is very inelastic (so that a small increase in output induced by an increase in K results in a large fall in the product price) and/or the scarcity effect is weak, i.e., when K and Z are easily substitutable in production. It is increasing in K when the opposite holds, i.e., when demand for the final good is very elastic and/or K and Z are not easily substitutable.
Period 1
In Period 1, entry and exit of firms will determine the total level of investment, K . The industry will be in equilibrium-i.e., there will be no further entry or exit-when the expected profit from an additional unit of capital is zero. Let r denote the unit cost of capital. Since all firms are ex ante identical, zero expected profit for an individual firm is the same as zero aggregate profits. The zero-profit condition can thus be written as:
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
where Z and K represent aggregate (industry) inputs of licenses and capital respectively. Equation (7) implicitly defines the equilibrium level of investment under transferability, which is denoted by ( ) T K Z . Consider the left hand side of Equation (7) first. Total revenue, ( , ) ( , )
T T P K Z Q K Z , is increasing (decreasing) in K if demand elasticity exceeds (is less than) unity, and independent of K if demand elasticity equals unity. As for the right hand side of Equation (7), the total cost of capital, rK , is clearly increasing in K , but the total cost of licenses, ( , ) 11 Intuitively, an increase in the restricted input will increase output. As a result, output price will fall and, if there is a high degree of substitution between the two inputs while demand for the output is inelastic, profit could fall as well, deterring entry into the industry.
Nontransferable Licenses
Now consider the case of nontransferable licenses. In this case, firms have to purchase their licenses before knowing β and they are unable to re-optimize (i.e., trade their licenses) after β is realized. Hence, the market for licenses clears in Period 1 and the market for the final good clears in Period 2.
Period 2
Given that 1 K = for each firm that entered the industry in Period 1, and that the firms are ex ante identical, all firms will have obtained the same number of licenses in Period 1:
( , ) / . 10 For stability, K should increase (decrease) when industry profits are positive (negative).
11 It can be shown that this result obtains even in the absence of uncertainty; it does not hinge on license transferability. It may also be possible to obtain this result in a general equilibrium framework where relaxing the quota generates negative income effects for quota holders due to lower license prices; in general, however, in such models, these income losses tend to be outweighed by the direct gains from relaxing the quota.
Hence, in Period 2, all firms will have the same amount of capital and the same number of licenses. However, they will not produce the same amount of output: the output of each firm will depend on its realization of β . Industry output in Period 2 is thus:
Follows from Equation (9) and the properties of ( , ) F K Z .
Setting supply equal to total demand for the final good yields the equilibrium price, )
. 
Period 1
In Period 1, the level of investment (or the number of firms), K , and the demand for licenses, Z , are determined, given Z . Only the distribution of β is known at this stage; the realization of β for each firm will be known only in Period 2.
Each firm is willing to pay the expected value of the marginal product of a license. And, as mentioned earlier, since firms are ex ante identical, each firm will purchase / Z K licenses. Hence, the license price under nontransferability is: In Period 1, entry and exit of firms will determine the total level of investment.
12 As before, the zero-profit condition is: 
Investment Under Transferability Versus Nontransferability
How do we compare equilibrium investment under license nontransferability with investment in the transferable case? Note that the position of the ( , )
NT NT
P K Z Q K Z line may be different from the ( , ) ( , )
T T P K Z Q K Z line considered previously. Under transferability, firms with a low realization of β can sell their licenses to those with a high realization in Period 2. Such license trades raise output (since the high-β firms will produce more) so that for any K , output under transferability is greater than output under nontransferability; correspondingly, output price under transferability is lower than output price under nontransferability. If total revenue is decreasing in (increasing in) (independent of) K , then the ( , ) ( , ) P K Z Q K Z line under transferability will be lower than (higher than) (the same as) that under nontransferability.
On the right hand side of Equation (12), rK is increasing in K , but ( , )
NT v K Z Z may be increasing or decreasing in K , as noted above. Comparing the license price under transferability and nontransferability is not straightfoward; Krishna and Tan (1999) show that when / Z K is very small (large), then v is higher (lower) under transferability than under nontransferability. Therefore, we are not likely to find a monotonic relation between the transferable and nontransferable license price, in general.
To summarize our results so far, we know that at any given level of investment, output under transferability is greater than output under 12 Note from Equations (9) and (11) that if the uncertainty takes the form of a mean-preserving spread in firm output, then the outcome with nontransferable licenses is the same as it would have been in the absence of uncertainty. In other words, the introduction of uncertainty in the form of a mean-preserving spread in output will have no effect on the level of investment if the restricted input is nontransferable, but may lead to higher or lower investment if the restricted input is transferable. nontransferability, and output price under transferability is lower than output price under nontransferability. However, nothing general can be said regarding the equilibrium level of investment under transferability versus nontransferability; the following are two illustrative examples that cast more light on the issue.
Cobb-Douglas Production Function
Suppose the final good is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production function,
, where 0 1 α < < . The Cobb-Douglas technology, which is commonly used in agricultural applications, implies that both inputs are essential for production, i.e., both capital and licenses must be used in strictly positive amounts to obtain a positive output. The elasticity of substitution between K and Z is unity. The intensive form for the firm's production function can be written as
Assume that β is uniformly distributed between 0 and 2, so
Assume that the demand for the final product is isoelastic, with elasticity ε , so ( )
. First, consider the case of transferable licenses. It can be shown that:
and:
Equating (13) and (14) yields the total level of investment under transferability:
, and independent of Z (and equal to / r α ) if 1 ε = . From Equation (15), it follows that liberalizing the input restriction can result in a contraction in industry size if demand for the final good is very inelastic. Now consider the case of nontransferable licenses. It can be shown that:
( 1 6 ) and:
Equating Equations (16) and (17) yields the total level of investment under nontransferability:
Comparing Equations (15) and (18), we have:
13 Thus, with a CobbDouglas production function and an isoelastic demand function, the equilibrium level of investment is higher (lower) under transferability compared with nontransferability if the elasticity of demand for the final product exceeds (is less than) unity, and the same in both cases if the elasticity of demand for the final product equals one.
Fixed Coefficients Production Function
Suppose the final good is produced using a Leontief (fixed coefficients) production function, ( , ) min( , )
To produce one unit of output, K and Z have to be combined in a specified ratio; there is no possibility of substitution between the inputs. This is a useful representation for output quotas, e.g., production or export licenses. When a firm is subject to an output control, it has to have a license for each unit of production; without a license, it cannot produce output even if it increases the other inputs. In other words, the production license can be viewed as an input that is not substitutable with any other inputs.
The firm's production function can be written as ( ) min(1, ) f z z β β = . Note that ( ) 1 f z ′ = for 0 1 z ≤ < and 0 for 1 z ≥ . Hence, the Leontief production function does not meet the Inada conditions. As before, we assume that β is uniformly distributed between 0 and 2, and that the demand for the final product is isoelastic with elasticity ε . (1/ 2) α for 0 1
(See Appendix II for the derivation.) As expected, ( , ) ( , )
, and constant (and equal to
T v K Z Z rK + is a continuous line that has a slope of r for K Z ≤ , has a slope less than r for K Z > , and takes the value of rZ at .
Equations (20) and (21) 
profits are negative at K Z = , so the equilibrium level of 
profits are positive at K Z = , so the equilibrium level of T K must occur above Z . In this case (which occurs when Z r ε − < ), the equilibrium T K will be given by the intersection of
This is depicted in Figures 1(c) , 2(c), and 3(c).
Note from Equations (22) and (23) ). Implicitly differentiating Equation (23), it can be shown that 0 . Hence:
if .
As in the transferable case,
NT NT If K Z = , one has to use the subgradient since the marginal product of z is not continuously differentiable at 1 z = . Hence: 15 Consider an increase in Z with a proportional increase in
Then the left hand side of Equation (23) will fall and the equality will no longer hold. Therefore for Equation (23) 
NT v K Z Z rK + line under nontransferability coincides with that under transferability when K Z < ; it jumps by
Equations (24) and (25) 
. This is depicted in Figures 1(c) , 2(c), and 3(c).
Intuitively, the expected value of the marginal product of K is equal to ), then investment is the same (and equal to r ε − ) under both regimes. When the input quota is binding, investment is higher under transferability than under nontransferability. This result can be understood intuitively as follows. When the license supply is small, output is necessarily small so the price of the final good is very high. As a result, the expected value of the marginal product of investment is very high. Under transferability, firms are willing to invest beyond Z since they know that they can buy a license and produce if they have a high enough realization of β . Under nontransferability, this will not happen. Hence, investment/entry will be higher under transferability than under nontransferability. When the license supply is large, the final good price will be too low to cover costs if firms enter up to Z . Hence, there will be fewer firms than licenses and ex post, no firm will be in want of a license. As a result, the license price will be zero, and investment (and output) will be the same in both the transferable and nontransferable case.
Conclusion
Quantity controls on production inputs and outputs occur frequently in practice. These controls may be implemented in various ways. This paper analyzes the implications for a competitive industry of input/output rationing that is effected through the sale of licenses. Two cases are considered: the case of transferable licenses (i.e., where resale is allowed) and the case of nontransferable licenses (i.e., where resale is prohibited). Using partial equilibrium analysis and a twoinput model of production with one restricted and one unrestricted input, we show that the possibility of license resale affects the level of investment in the industry. Key factors to consider are the elasticity of demand for the final good and the degree of substitutability between the restricted and unrestricted inputs. With a Cobb-Douglas production function, where the elasticity of substitution between the inputs is equal to unity, the equilibrium level of investment under transferability is higher than under nontransferability if demand elasticity is high, and lower than under nontransferability if demand elasticity is low. With a fixed coefficients production function, where there is no substitution between the two inputs, investment/entry is higher under transferability than under nontransferability as long as the quota is binding.
Finally, although it is often assumed that liberalizing the input restriction would increase investment in the affected industry, we show that if the demand for the final good is very inelastic, liberalizing the input restriction may actually shrink the industry rather than boost its growth. 
Differentiating Equation (5) with respect to K and using (27): ( ) .
Denote the share of licenses in industry output as from (4) and (5). Substituting (32) and (33) into Equation (31), we have: 1 .
From (27) and (28):
Substituting Equations (61), (62), and (63) in the numerator of the expression on the right hand side of Equation (60), and using (51) and (57):
(1 ) 1 1 ( ) .
Substituting Equations (53), (62), and (64) in the denominator of the expression on the right hand side of Equation (60), and using (51) and (57) 
